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Control of Nonpoint Source Pollution
Through Voluntary Incentive-Based
Policies: An Application to Nitrate
Contamination in New York
Jeffrey M. Peterson and Richard N. Boisvert
A voluntary program is developed to achieve environmental goals through the self-interested
choices of farmers under environmental risk and asymmetric information. Farmers behave to
maximize expected net returns, and environmental quality standards are formulated through
chance constraints. Because the government may not know each farmer’s soil type, policy
options must be self-selecting. The model is applied empirically to nitrate leaching and runoff
from corn production in three New York regions. Asymmetric information between producers
and the government would impose additional cost burdens on society, but these costs are
modest in the context of other farm programs.
Agricultural nonpoint source pollution now ac-
counts for a large share of water quality problems
in the United States [Ribaudo et al. 1999), and
remains one of the most difficult policy challenges.
Uniform policies, such as taxes or limits on pol-
luting inputs, have been shown to be inefficient
because farms are so heterogeneous (Braden et al.
199 1; Carpenter et al. 1998). However, standard
cost-efficient remedies such as discharge fees or
tradable permits are impossible since emissions
cannot be observed.
Because the benefits and costs of reducing farm
pollution vary over space, an optimal policy would
require adjustments in production to differ across
farms. Yet, by definition, the benefits of control-
ling nonpoint pollution at each site may never be
known and policies must concentrate on reducing
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pollution at minimum cost within regions. In recent
years, there has been an increased capacity for gov-
ernments to implement cost-efficient production
changes through command-and-control (CAC)
policies, which would account for heterogeneity of
farms by using existing soil maps, improved geo-
graphic information systems (GIS) databases, and
biophysical simulation models of pollutants. Such
a strategy is often criticized for being too intrusive
and administratively costly.
As an alternative that is more consistent with the
voluntary nature of past farm programs, Wu and
Babcock (1995, 1996) proposed a decentralized
scheme that allows farmers to choose from a set of
predetermined policies. In their policy setting,
farm pollution (e.g., nutrient leaching) differs by
soil type, but each farmer’s type is private infor-
mation. Rather than assigning policies based on
observable characteristics, the government must
design a mechanism that gives farmers the proper
incentives to self-select appropriate policies. Such
a strategy has already been attempted in small re-
gions as part of the Water Quality Incentive Pro-
gram (Wu and Babcock 1996), Analytically, the
government’s problem is to maximize social wel-
fare by finding a policy schedule that relates pol-
luting input levels to “green” payments. Under
some conditions, the schedule can be designed so
that farmers of different types select distinct poli-
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ties, as efficiency requires. This result is an im-
portant conceptual achievement, but it relies on
several assumptions that would need to be relaxed
if the program were implemented. Namely, it as-
sumes that the social cost of pollution is known,
and that pollution and farm profits are certain for
each input level. Given the “noise” in a real policy
setting, we still do not know whether self-selecting
policies are possible, and a framework for estimat-
ing the cost of these policies is still absent.
In this paper, we design and estimate a voluntary
“green” payment program to reduce agricultural
pollution under uncertainty. As a base of compari-
son, we assume that the government is capable of
calculating soil-specific policies to meet some
emissions standard, and that it also knows which
soils are present on each farm from soil maps. In
principle, the government could therefore assign
regulations to each farm by CAC. We derive the
conditions under which these regulations could in-
stead be self-selected through voluntary “green”
payments. We also show that the payments needed
for self-selection exceed farmers’ pollution control
costs, Assuming that assigned policies would com-
pensate for control costs exactly, this implies that
self-selection imposes some additional cost on the
government. One interpretation of the additional
cost is the value of having the soils information, or
what the government could afford to pay to collect
it. Alternatively, any comparative evaluation of
these two policy strategies must weigh the addi-
tional cost of self-selection against the administra-
tive cost and intrusiveness of CAC.
The empirical application is for reductions in
nitrogen fertilizer to reduce nonpoint nitrate leach-
ing and runoff in three regions of New York, but
the model could easily be applied to other environ-
mental goals or other production practices. To ac-
count for uncertain pollution, we set emissions
standards that limit the probability of severe emis-
sions, in the spirit of the chance constraints of
Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988). This second-
best strategy circumvents the need to determine the
social cost of pollution, and is consistent with the
standards approach to environmental regulation
discussed by Baumol and Oates (1988) and prac-
ticed by many agencies. We find that control costs
to reduce nitrate residuals in New York differ by
region, but are not large when compared with the
costs of other farm programs, particularly if they
were targeted at especially vulnerable areas. The
added cost of self-selection is not large in this case,
although it may be larger for a similar program
applied to regions in another part of the country.
We proceed with a theoretical analysis to char-
acterize optimal policy outcomes. The empirical
results are next presented and are followed by
some policy implications.
Theoretical Model
Consider two groups of farmers (i = 1, 2) produc-
ing corn using nitrogen fertilizer; land differs by
group, both by productivity and nitrate contamina-
tion potential. ] Land can be meaningfully classi-
fied into soil groups because both productivity and
nutrient losses depend on hydrologic characteris-
tics (Thomas and Boisvert 1995; Crutchfield et al.
1992). Group i’s corn yield per acre is yi(Ni, W),
where y’ is a twice differentiable and strictly con-
cave production function, Ni is nitrogen fertilizer,
and W is a vector of (uncontrollable) weather vari-
ables. For simplicity, other inputs are assumed to
be fixed, The prices of corn and fertilizer are p and
r, respectively, and the total cost of other inputs is
V. Under a government water quality program,
farmers may be eligible to receive a “green” pay-
ment of Si per acre. Note that y*,IVi,and Si differ by
group, but prices, weather, and other costs do not.
At the time Ni must be chosen, prices and
weather conditions are uncertain. Farmers seek to
maximize expected net return per acre, but do not
know the exact joint distribution of p, r, and W.
Following Collender and Chalfant (1986), assume
that input decisions are based on a minimum-
variance unbiased estimator of net returns from a
random sample of J prices and weather conditions:
(1)
J
i? (Ni, Si) = ; ~(pjyi(lvi, Wj)– rjNi – V+ Si)
]=i
where tbe sample {p} r} Wj), j = 1, . . . . J
may be drawn, for example, from historical ob-
servations over J years. Before any government
program, payments Si are zero, and farmers solve:
~S~ ~ (Ni, O). Because strict concavity of ~ in Ni
follows from the same property of y’, a solution to
this problem must be unique. We assume the so-
lution exists and denote it NiO.
Group i’s nitrate emissions are ei(Ni, W), which
are random because they depend on W. Assuming
the region is small enough so that the damages
from nitrate emissions are similar everywhere, eco-
nomic efficiency can be achieved by establishing
some standard on group i’s fertilizer use. This stan-
dard may be set, for example, based on the ex-
1For simplicity, and realistically for administrative reasons, we con-
sider only two groups, but an arbitrary number of groups could be con-
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petted level of emissions or on the probability that
emissions exceed some given amount e*. Denote
the fertilizer standard for group i by Ni*.2 To set
these standards, the government either knows or
can estimate ei. Assume also that yi can be esti-
mated from research trials on different soils. If, in
addition, the government knows to which group
each farmer belongs, then information is symmet-
ric; if not, information is asymmetric.
Setting Policies in the Short Run
In the short run, the number of corn acres in each
group Ai is fixed. To minimize the cost of program





subject to: ~i~ (), s, ~ (), Ni s ~, i = 1,2, (Ei)
F (iv,, S,) = R’(Ay,o), (P,)
~2 (N2,S2) a ~ (MO), (P,)
~’ (N1,S1) z F1 (N2,SJ, (I, )
Z2 (N2,SJ z ? (N, S, ), (12)
The government minimizes the cost of ensuring
that emissions standards are met (constraints (Ei)),
through changes in nitrogen fertilizer, Since the
program is voluntary, the participation constraints
(Pi) require post-policy expected returns to be at
least at the pre-policy levels. Because the gover-
nment does not know each farmer’s group, both
policies would be available to all producers. For
farmers to self-select the policy designed for their
group, S1 and S2 must also satisfy the incentive
compatibility y constraints (Ii), guaranteeing that
group i’s post-policy expected net return is at least
as great under its own policy as it would be under
group j’s policy. If information is symmetric, then
the government offers only one policy to each
group and the constraints (IJ can be ignored.3
2Nitrate emissions themselves only have an indirect effect on dam-
ages, which depend on the ambient concentration of nitrates in drinking
water, Nonetheless, emissions are almost always used as the pollution
variable in the literature because the physical flow of nutrients into and
within aquifers is so poorly understood (Teague, Bernardo, and Mapp
1995; Helfand and House 1995; Johnson, Adams, and Perry 1991). Con-
ceptually, if emissions from each farm within a type affect social dam-
ages differently, then there are as many types as farmers. Policies could
theoretical y be designed for thk case (Wn and Babcock 1996) but they
would be difficult to implement in practice.
3 Another potential source of asymmetric information may be the di-
versity of per-acre net returns within a soil group. We have abstracted
from this complexity because the policy incentives are based only on
Geometrically, the solution depends on the level
sets of ~, i.e., the locus of all combinations of Ni
and Si for which expected net return is constant.
Figure J(a) depicts examples of these level sets,
where R: traces out the pairs (Ni, Si) that ge~erate
the pre-policy level of expected net returns R’(N~,
O). Note that the pre-policy solutions are at the
intersections with the horizontal axis where Si = O.
For a solution to exist when information is
asymmetric, the level sets of El and ~2 must satisfy
the “single-crossing property” (Mas-Collel et al.
1995); one of the groups must always need more
compensation for the same reduction in nitrogen
fertilizer. This property holds in figure 1(a) be-
cause @ is steeper than ~& More generally, the
property requires:
where subscripts denote derivatives. At all points
in N-S space, the slope of one level set must exceed
the slope of the other; with no loss in enerality,
-P. we have assigned the indexes i so that R ls_steeper
than ~1. Substituting the derivatives of R’ from





x ~ Pjy%N~Wi) – rj z ~ ,_ PjykSN~Wj) – rj
,=I J– 1
For a solution to exist in the asymmetric case, the
mean of marginal net returns for group 2 must be
larger than for group 1. It follows immediately that
the single crossing property is satisfied if y~N, W)
> y~N, W), for aIl (N,W,); if group 2’s marginal
product of nitrogen is higher at every fertilization
level and for all weather conditions, the mean mar-
ginal returns across weather observations is aIso
higher.
This result underscores the fact that “green”
payments depend on land productivity and fertil-
marginal changes in returns (movements along the net return fanctioas)
due to changes in fertilizer, not the levels of returns. Conceptually,
variation within groups could be accommodated by adding a disturbance
term to the changes in returns. From the government’s point of view, the
constra&t (Pl ), for example, would then involve the stochastic change
AN = R’(~, O)-~’ (IV],.S1 ) + q where e, represents the variation across
farms in group i, (defined such that E[er] = O); the precise statement of
(P, ) would be in probabilistic terms: Pr{AR = 0) > ~, where ~ is some
confidence level close 10 1. Such constraints describe confidence inter-
vals around the constraints in problem (2) that represent tbe govern-
ment’s uncertain y over the change in each producer’s net returns.130 Oc~ober 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
s~
c
zoptimal policy for group 2
optimal policy for group 1
s,





optimal policy for group 2




Figure 1. Policies under Symmetric Informa-
tion
ization levels. In reality, these relationships are
empirical questions, but we assume two condi-
tions:
Cl: Yi(N,W) > y~(N,W), C2: O s N:<@
From above, C 1 is sufficient for the single crossing
property to hold, C2 means producers decrease fer-
tilization rates to meet environmental standards,
which rules out uninteresting cases.
The nature of the “green” payments can be sum-
marized in the three statements below. Since we do
not know a priori which group must fertilize at a
lower rate to satisfy environmental standards, we
must consider two cases: N; 5 N; and N1* < N2*.
While Peterson and Boisvert (1998) establish these
statements formally, they are also easily verified
by graphical arguments because N and S are the
only decision variables.
STATEMENT 1: Suppose that information is sym-
metric and C2 is satisfied. Then, whether N; ~ N;
or N; < N;, the constraints (Ei) and (Pi) will bind
in the optimal policies for i = 1,2.
Figures 1<a) and 1(b) correspond to the cases N;
5 N, and N, < N;, respectively. Because expected
revenue along the curves ~~ and ~~ are the pre-
policy levels, the participation constraints (P,) and
(PJ are met on and above ~~ and ~~, respectively.
In figure 1(a), a policy for group 1 (N1, S,) satisfies
(EL) if it lies on or to the left of the vertical line at
N, , and the feasible set that satisfies both (Pl ) and
(.E1) is region abc. The minimum payment in this
region is point b; both constraints bind. Similarly,
the feasible set for group 2’s polig is region def
lying to the left of N2* and above R;. Point e is the
policy that minimizes payments. Parallel reasoning
leads to the optimal policies h and k in figure 1(b).
STATEMENT 2: Suppose information is asymmet-
ric and CI–C2 are satisfied. Then, whether N; s
N; or N; < N;, constraints (Ez) and (PJ bind in
the optimal policy for group 2,
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) correspond to N; 5 N;
and N; < N;, respectively. Based on the same rea-
soning as above, group 2’s constraints (E2) and
(PJ are satisfied in regions mno in figure 2(a) and
pqr in figure 2(b); payments are minimized at n
and q. The extra self-selection constraints, (11) and
(12)require that group 1‘s polig lie on or above the
iso-expected revenue curves R 1passing through n
and q. Choosing n and q as group 2’s policies also
minimizes group 1‘s payment; any higher payment
to group 2 would raise the minimum bound on the
payment to group 1.
STATEMENT 3: Suppose that inform~tion ~ asym-
metric and C1–C2 are satisfied. If Nz s N,, group
I will share group 2‘s policy, with (El) nonbind-
ing; if N; < N;, group 1 will have a separate
policy, with constraints (I,) and (El) binding, and
(Pl) nonbinding.
In figures 2(c) and 2(d), group 2’s optimal poli-
cies are again at points n and q, respectively. In
both figures, a policy for group 1 (Nl, S,) satisfies:
(El) on or to the left of the vertical line at N, *, (11)
on or above the curve ~’, and (IJ on or below the
curve ~~. In figure 2(c), where N; s N;, the fea-
sible set that satisfies these constraints is region
snt. The minimum payment to group 1 is at n,
verifying the groups will share the same policy,
and that (El ) is nonbinding. In figure 2(d), where
N; < N;, the feasible region is UVWX.Here, the
minimum payment occurs at w, where the con-
straints (El) and (11) bind. Finally, note that w lies
strictly above the curve @, implying the constraint
(Pl ) is nonbinding,
These results have important implications. If in-
formation is symmetric, fertilization levels for both
of the cases satisfy the environmental standards
exactly and producers in both groups are indiffer-
ent between participating or not (figure 1). If in-
formation is asymmetric and group 2 (whose yield
function is steeper) is the most prone to pollute,













Figure 2. Policies under Asymmetric Information
the same rate and receive the same payment. To
ensure this fertilization level meets the environ-
mental standards, group 1 is compensated to re-
duce fertilizer more than necessary (figure 2(c)). If
information is asymmetric and if group 2 generates
less leaching and runoff than group 1, the mecha-
nism allows policies to diverge, At the optimal
policies in this case, the fertilization levels for both
groups meet environmental standards exactly.
Group 2 is indifferent between participating or not,
while group 1 is strictly better off.
It follows that asymmetric information always
leads to higher payments. If the government offers
a uniform policy, it must pay group 1 to reduce
fertilizer more than necessary; if separate policies
are offered, group 1‘s payment is more than their
loss in net returns to self-select. Empirically, this
extra government cost, or “information premium,”
can be found by estimating payments in both the
asymmetric and symmetric cases. If the govern-
ment already has soils information, the difference
in costs is society’s “price” of allowing farmers to
choose their own policies. Otherwise, it represents
the opportunity value of information, which would
need to be weighed against the cost of collecting it.
Setting Policies in the Long Run
In the long run, the number of acres in corn pro-
duction depends on expected net returns, and
policy targets on total emissions require that limits
also be placed on corn acreage. The government’s
long-run problem can be written:
min A1(~l(N1,S1))S1 +A2(~2(N2,S2))S2
{s,,S2,AJ, ,IV2}
subject to: (Ei), (Pi), (Ii), i= 1,2
Ai(~”(NJJ) s A: i = 1,2
where A; = Ai(~(N~, O)) is group i’s pre-policy
corn acreage. If information is symmetric, the op-
timal short-run policies are also optimal in the long
run. Since the self-selection constraints (Ii) can be
ignored in this case, post-policy returns per acre for
both groups are equal to the pre-policy levels
(statement 1), generating no additional incentive to
change acreage (Ai = AiO). If information is asym-
metric, there is again no incentive for group 2 to
change acreage, but under some conditions the
constraint (Pl ) is nonbinding in the optimal short-
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Figure 3. Three New York Farming Regions
policy net returns per acre exceed the pre-policy
level. This may provide a sufficient incentive for
grou 1 to expand acreage in the program (e.g., A,
I > Al ).
This “entry problem” is an inherent property of
environmental subsidies (Baumol and Oates 1988;
Spulber 1985), which could be avoided by elimi-
nating the incentive to expand acreage through
other means. For example, program eligibility
could be limited to historical base acreage as for
past commodity payments. Yet, the severity of the
entry problem is an empirical question. We esti-
mate the potential severity in the application be-
low, by finding the optimal short-run policies and
then simulating the long-run adjustments based on
empirical corn acreage-response functions from
the literature.
An Application to Corn Production in
New York
Our model is applied to simulate policies to reduce
nitrate leaching and runoff from corn production in
three regions of New York, which correspond
roughly to production regions in the Cornell Co-
operative Extension dairy farm business project
(figure 3). Although farmland in much of New
York, as in other dairy regions, is primarily made
up of heavier soils situated on hillsides, these re-
gions do reflect differences in topography, soils,
climate, and land use.
The Eastern Plateau (EASPLT) is in the Appa-
lachian Uplands, characterized by flat-topped hills
with long, relatively steep slopes and large, flat
valleys. The southern section of Central New York
(CENNY) is also part of the Appalachian Uplands,
while the northern part is in the Erie-Ontario Plain,
made up of deep soils with gentle to moderate
slope, Much of the Western Plain (WESPLN) lies
in the Ontario Lowlands with a gently rolling to-
pography and differences in elevation usually less
than 30 feet. Farms tend to be largest in WESPLN.
By region, between one-fifth and one-third of the
cropland is in corn.
To estimate “green” payments for these regions,
corn acreage is classified into two soil groups and
corn yields are estimated for each. Based on these
functions, along with observations of weather and
prices, and soil characteristics by parcel for a
sample of New York farms, payments are com-
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trate emissions are estimated for over 47,000 par-
cels to obtain fertilizer standards by group, and
payments are estimated for each group based on
the two yield functions.
Data and Estimation
Throughout the empirical model, corn acreage is
divided into group 1 (soils from Hydrologic group
A) and group 2 (soils from Hydrologic groups B
and C).4 Hydrologic A soils have a coarser texture
and are more vulnerable to leaching than B or C
soils (Crutchfield et al. 1992). Corn silage yield
functions for these groups are estimated from field
trial data collected at several sites by the Depart-
ment of Soil, Crop, and Atmospheric Sciences at
Cornell University and from weather stations near
the trial locations. These data contain 66 combina-
tions of yield, fertilization rates, and weather, with
12 observations from group 1 soils and 54 from
group 2. To gain efficiency, the function was esti-
mated in a pooled regression (t-ratios):
+ 0i~9$6 W2 – ~:()()\3 WIN R2 = 0.72
SiIage yields (tons per acre) (y) depend on a
dummy variable for soils (D = 1 for group 2, 0
otherwise), total nitrogen applied (N),5 grow-
ing season rainfall in inches (WI), and growing
degree days (W2). See Peterson and Boisvert
(1998) for specification and estimation details.
The estimated coefficients of the model have
theoretically expected signs and the fit also appears
adequate. At average weather and fertilization rates
of 100 lbs. per acre, a one-pound increase in nitro-
gen fertilizer increases yield by 0.038 tons and
0.048 tons per acre for groups 1 and 2, respec-
tively. A one-inch increase in growing season rain-
fall increases yield by 1.56 and 0.07 tons/acre for
the two groups, respectively. A 100-unit increase
in accumulated growing degree days results in a
0.66 ton/acre increase in yield for both groups. The
yield functions are adjusted ex post to allow for
15% harvest and other losses.
The specification is based on previous agro-
nomic evidence (New York State College of Ag-
riculture and Life Sciences 1987) that light and
heavy soils represent distinct yield groups, allow-
ing the marginal products of nitrogen and rainfall
to differ across groups. The small value (and rela-
tively small t-ratio) of the coefficient on the slope
dummy term DN2 suggests that the expected pro-
ductivity differential of nitrogen was not well
manifested in our cross-sectional data of the two
soil groups. By maintaining this specification in
the analysis below, however, we show that even
this small difference in productivity leads to a sub-
stantial difference in payments. Clearly, if such a
program were to be implemented, the yield func-
tions would need to be estimated more precisely
from more comprehensive field trials on a larger
sample of soils.
Expected net returns are simulated in each re-
gion by equation (1), using the estimated yield
functions above and a sample of time series obser-
vations on (real) prices and weather for the 30-year
period 1963–1992. The prices pj and rj in this se-
ries are imputed from corn gram and urea prices
from New York Agricultural Statistics,h and the
weather variables are taken from a central weather
station in each region. Variable costs other than
nitrogen V are based on enterprise budgets from
Schmit (1994) and the USDA (1994). All prices
and costs are converted to constant 1992 dollars.
Because New York farmers typically apply ma-
nure, a 70-pound nitrogen credit (from 20 tons of
manure per acre) is assumed. Optimal pre-policy
@utilization levels N? are found by maximizing
R’(Ni,O) numerically. These optimal rates for
group 1 range from 129 pounds per acre in
CENNY to 132 pounds in EASPLT, while those
for group 2 are about 30 pounds higher (table 1).
Nitrate emissions for group i are simulated from
estimated functions that relate nitrate runoff (ejJ
and leaching (e~) on New York soils to nitrogen
application, soil characteristics, and rainfall vari-
ables (Boisvert et al. 1997). This system of equa-
tions has a recursive structure:
e; = e~(Ni, W; Ci)
‘) e: = e~(Ni, W; Ci, eR
where the vector w contains four rainfall variables
(inches of annual rainfall and rain within 14 days
of planting, fertilizer, and harvest); and Ciis a vec-
tor of five soil characteristics (pounds of nitrogen
mineralized by the soil per acre, average percent
4Hydrologic group is a classification of soils based on their capacity
to permit infiltration.
5N is pounds of nitrogen from manure and inorganic fertilize manure
is assumed to contain 3.5 pounds of nitrogen per ton.
‘ While the production functions were estimated from silage yields,
only shout 40% of corn acreage is harvested for silage in New York, with
the remainder for com grain. The imputed silage prices represent the
OPPO~unity value in terms of foregone sales in the grain market,134 October 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Estimated Pre- and Post-Policy Fertilizer, Returns, and Payments, by Region
and Group
CENNY EASPLT WESPLN
Description Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Pre-policy variables
Fertilizer (pounds per acre) 129 160 132 165 131 164
Implied crirical emissions level (pounds per acre) 28.7 32.4 21,6 14.6 35.9 30.9
Corn silage yield, mean (tons per acre) 20,3 17.5 19.6 18.3 19.9 18,2
Net returns from corn production, mean ($ per acre) 188.44 121.65 173.53 135.98 178.70 135.08
Post-policy variables, 20% standard
Fertilizer (pounds per acre) 123 147 93 I54 113 152
Critical emission level (pounds per acrer 25.8 25.8 12.8 12.8 25.0 25.0
Corn silage yield, mean (tons per acre) 20.2 17.2 18.5 18.1 19.5 18.0
Net returns from corn production, mean ($ Per acre) 188.28 120.96 165.99 135.54 177.02 134.54
Payment, symmetric information ($ per acre) 0.16 0.69 7.54 0.44 1.68 0.54
Payment, asymmetric information ($ per acre) 0.86 0,69 7.99 0.44 2.22 0.54
Information premium ($ per acre)b 0.70 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.54 0.00
Post-policy variables, 40% standard
Fertilizer (pounds per acre) 107 131 76 129 98 135
Critical emission level (pounds per acrey 19,3 19.3 9.6 9.6 18.8 18.8
Corn silage yield, mean (tons per acre) 19.8 16.8 17.8 17.4 19.1 17.6
Net returns from com production, mean ($ per acre) 186.13 118.28 158.03 130.99 173.19 131.83
Payment, symmetric information ($ per acre) 2.32 3.38 15.50 4.91 5.50 3.25
Payment, asymmetric information ($ per acre) 5.69 3.38 20.36 4.91 8.75 3.25
Information premium ($ per acre)’ 3.37 0.00 4,86 0.00 3.25 0.00
‘Based on a 20’% or 40% reduction from the weighted average pre-policy safety level in each region, with proportions of corn
acreage as weights.
‘Difference between payments under symmetric information and asymmetric information for group 1.
field slope, percent organic matter, soil horizon
depth, and the erodibility factor K). The translog
specification of this model, along with the esti-
mated coefficients and regression statistics are de-
tailed in Boisvert et al. (1997).
Distributions of total nitrate emissions ei = e:+
e~, are simulated for both groups in each region
from the above equations over the 30-year sample
of rainfall observations and a 142-farm sample of
soil characteristics (Kelleher and Bills 1989), con-
ditional on the fertilization level.7 Table 2 reports
selected statistics of the sample and of the distri-
butions of pre-policy emissions. The distribution of
soils in the sample is fairly representative of the
actual distribution (as reflected in the 1982 Na-
tional Resources Inventory) with the possible ex-
ception of the EASPLT region, where the propor-
tion of soils in hydrologic group A appears high
(Boisvert et al. 1997).
The simulated distributions of emissions have
30 observations, where each observation is a
weighted average of emissions across soils for one
year of weather observations, with soil acreages as
weights, Reported in table 2 are the means of the
7This measure of emissions implicitly assigns equal weight to the
damages from leaching and runoff. Unequal weights that vary by loca-
tion could easily be accommodated.
30-year distributions and their 90th percentiles (the
amount of soil-averaged emissions exceeded for 3
observations out of 30). We specify environmental
standards as chance constraints that limit the prob-
ability of severe emission levels. That is, fertilizer
use Ni must bet set so that Pr[ei > e*] s a, where
e“ is some critical “safety level” of nitrate loss and
u is a small probability. We set a = 0.1 and
choose e* for each region as reductions from the
90’h percentiles in table 2.
Across the three regions, pollution differs much
more than fertilizer, reflecting the differences in
soil, topography, and weather, Because of the large
hills in the Appalachian Uplands, cropland in EAS-
PLT is steeper than the other two regions; about
4070 and 30% of fields in EASPLT have a slope of
8910 or more for the two groups, respectively, sub-
stantially more than the other regions (table 2).
However, the EASPLT region receives the least
rainfall and soils there have the highest capacity to
mineralize nitrogen, resulting in the lowest simu-
lated levels of both runoff and leaching. In all three
regions, there is also a clear difference between
groups. Group 1 soils mineralize less nitrogen and
have smaller K-factors (i.e., are less erosive), and
therefore emit less runoff than group 2. However,
the coarser textured soils in group 1 leach signifi-
cantly more than group 2, even though fertilizer isPeterson and Boisvert Con(rol of Nonpoint Source Pollution through Voluntary Incentive-Based Policies 135
Table 2. Soil Characteristics and Pre-Policy Pollution Levels from a Sample of New York
Farms, by Region and Group
CENNY EASPLT WESPLN
Description Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Sample statistics
Number of observations
Proportion of sample acreage in group, by region
Proportion of acreage in group, by region, NRI”
Selected soil and weather characteristics
Proportion with field slope of 3% or more
Proportion with field slope of 8% or more
Total annual rainfall, mean (inches)
Nitrogen mineralized by soil, mean (pounds per acre)
K erodibility factor, mean
Pre-policy pollution Ievelsb
Nitrogen fertilizer (pounds per acre)
Nitrate runoff, mean (pounds per acre)
Nitrate leaching, mean (pounds per acre)
Nitrate loss, mean (pounds per acre)















































































“From the 1982 National Resources Inventory.
‘Computed across soils and weather conditions over the period 1963–1992.
“Quantity exceeded 10% of the time (3 of 30 observatio~s).
about 30 pounds lower. Because leaching makes
up a much larger share of total emissions than run-
off, group 1 is the more polluting soil group in
every region.
The Policy Experiment
Applying the theoretical results from above, the
policy experiment is to determine the optimal
“green” payments to each group to achieve 20%
and 40% reductions in pre-policy safety levels of
nitrate emissions. Since absolute levels of emis-
sions vary substantially by region (table 2), these
relative standards provide a consistent basis for
comparing the costs of improved environmental
quality across diverse regions.8 The pre-policy 90’h
percentiles of emissions in CENNY and WESPLN
(about 30 lbs/acre) are much larger than in EAS-
PLT (15–22 lbs/acre), If the same relative reduc-
tion is imposed on all three regions, the absolute
level of environmental quality will be significantly
higher in EASPLT,
The fertilization rates that meet the relative en-
vironmental standards are determined by iterative
s To ensure that post-policy emissions are the same for both groups in
each region, the 20% and 40% reductions are based on tbe weighted
average of pre-policy critical levels across the two groups, with group
acreages as weights, Peterson and Boisvert (t998) also examine policies
to meet absolute standards, where post-policy emissions are equal across
regions as well as groups. The dlffererrces in fefliiization levels and
payments across regions are generally similar to those for relative stan-
dards, but are slightly more dramatic.
comparisons of simulated distributions of leaching
and runoff. To accomplish a 2090 reduction in ni-
trate loss, the allowable nitrogen levels vary from
93 to 123 lbs./acre for group 1 and from 147 to 154
lbs./acre for group 2 (table 1). For the 40% reduc-
tion, fertilization levels range from 76 to 107 lbs./
acre and from 129 to 135 lbs/acre for the two
groups, respectively. The environmentally safe ni-
trogen levels are always smaller for group 1, im-
plying that separate policies will be optimal in ev-
ery region if information is asymmetric (state-
ment 3).
Optimal Payments
To study program costs, optimal policies are cal-
culated under symmetric information (meeting
only conditions (Ei) and (Pi) in equation (2)) and
under asymmetric information (meeting conditions
(E’i), (Pi), and (Ii)). If information is symmetric,
government payments reflect the cost of foregone
production income to improve environmental qual-
ity. Payments for both groups are determined by
equating the respective pre- and post-policy ex-
pected levels of net return, where post-policy fer-
tilization rates satisfy environmental standards. For
a 2096 reduction in nitrate loss, the payments are as
high as $7.54 per acre for group 1, but are less than
$1 for group 2 (table 1). The next increment in
environmental quality comes at a substantially
greater cost; for a 4090 reduction in nitrate loss,
payments to group 1 range from about $2 to $16136 October 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Aggregate Corn Acreage and Estimated Payments, by Region and Group
CENNY EASPLT WESPLN
Description Group i Group 2 Total Group 1 Group 2 To~dl Group 1 Group 2 Total
Corn Acreage (thousand acresy








Commodity Payments, 1992 ($000)”
12 277 289 26 98
2 191 193 196 43
10 191 201 208 43
8 0 8 12 0
12 938 949 404 481
12 938 949 530 481


















‘Based on the 1992 Census of Agriculture.
‘Direct federal payments to producers, excluding Conservation and Wetland Reserve payments.
per acre for group 1 and $3 to $5 per acre for group
2. Because the reduction in fertilizer is generally
larger for group 1, this group receives larger pay-
ments to restore pre-policy levels of expected net
returns; payments are highest in EASPLT, where
fertilizer must be reduced the most.
If information is asymmetric, the payments
above will not lead to self-selection. To see this,
consider group 1‘s policy decision in CENNY for
the 40% standard. The payment of $2.32 reflects
group 1‘s lost income from reducing fertilizer to
107 pounds. But group 1 would prefer group 2’s
policy if given the choice, because it restricts fer-
tilizer to no more than 131 pounds and includes a
larger payment of $3.38. For farmers in group 1 to
self-select, their payment must be raised until their
own policy makes them just as well off as group
2’s policy. The computed payment to group 1 un-
der asymmetric information ($5.69) is made up of
two components: a compensation for lost net re-
turns ($2.32), and an information premium ($3.37)
needed to ensure self-selection because the gov-
ernment cannot identify groups.
By statements 2 and 3, the payments for the
asymmetric case can be computed from binding
constraints in the policy problem. Group 1‘s pay-
ments in table 1 are solutions to a binding self-
selection constraint (11), and group 2’s payments
are solutions to a binding participation constraint
(P-J. The information premium to group 1 is less
than $1 for the 20% standard and ranges from
about $3 to $5 per acre for the 40910standard, rais-
ing payments to as high as $20 per acre. Group 2’s
payments do not change from the symmetric case.
Program Costs
Table 3 contains the estimated aggregate govern-
ment cost (excluding administrative costs) to
achieve environmental standards in each region.
Interestingly, estimated aggregate costs are largest
in EASPLT, the region with the smallest corn acre-
age. The share of corn acreage in group 1, which
receives a larger payment than group 2, is larger in
EASPLT than in the other two regions, causing the
average payment per acre to be much higher. In all
three regions, aggregate costs are substantially
larger for the 40% reduction, but are still small
relative to commodity program payments. The es-
timated aggregate information premium is about
$30,000for the 20% standardand about$200,000
for the 40910standard, representing only about 5%
and 7?t0 of the cost of the proposed program, re-
spectively.
Aside from excluding administrative costs, the
estimated payments in table 3 rest on several sim-
plifying assumptions that may have affected the
results. First, all inputs except nitrogen fertilizer
were assumed fixed. While agronomic evidence
suggests that other inputs cannot be easily substi-
tuted for nitrogen (Paris 1992), the possibility of
substitution means that payments may have been
over-estimated somewhat because net returns will
not fall as much as predicted, Similarly, environ-
mental constraints were met by reducing fertilizer
only, but payments may be smaller for a program
that combined these input reductions with abate-
ment activities (such as more efficient application
methods) in a least-cost way. Such a program is
conceivable, but would require the government to
have data to estimate the cost and environmental
effect of each practice.
Second, the payments are solutions to the short-
run policy problem and do not consider farmers’
long-run decisions to allocate land. Under symmet-
ric information, the program generates no incentive
to expand corn acreage because the payments just
compensate for lost net returns. In the asymmetricPe~erson and Boisver~ Control of Nonpoirrt Source Pollution through Voluntary Incentive-Based Policies 137
case, only group 1 sees an increase in net returns
that may alter decisions at the extensive margin,
but some simple computations suggest the effect
on acreage would be negligible. In the most ex-
treme case (the 40% standard in EASPLT), the
increase in group 1‘s returns is equivalent to a
1.3% increase in the average corn price, Assuming
an acreage elasticity of 0.2 (Tegene et al. 1988;
Lee and Helmberger 1985), acreage increases by
about 0.25%; for the region as a whole this repre-
sents a change of less than 100 acres out of
124,000 and a consequent increase in payments of
about $1,300 out of $1 million.
Finally, farmers are assumed to be risk neutral.
If they are instead risk averse, the effect on pay-
ments depends on whether nitrogen is a risk-
increasing or risk-reducing input (Ramaswami
1992). If it increases risk (so that fertilizer reduc-
tions reduce risk), payments based only on average
returns are over-estimated; analogously, payments
are under-estimated if nitrogen is risk-reducing. If
farmers’ risk attitudes were identical and known,
Peterson and Boisvert (1998) estimate the risk bias
in payments would range from less than $1 to
about $5 per acre. Estimates of the true bias would
require a model that incorporates each farmer’s
unknown risk attitude as another piece of private
information.
Summary and Policy Implications
In this paper, we model a “green” payment pro-
gram to improve water quality by reducing nitro-
gen fertilizer, where environmental goals are
achieved through self-interested choices of two
groups of farmers. Distinct policies can be self-
selected by group if, at the margin, the most pro-
ductive group pollutes the least. In this case, the
pollution-intensive group receives a payment that
exceeds their loss in net returns. This excess por-
tion is an information premium that could be
avoided if soils information were used to assign
policies by farm.
Payments are estimated to achieve both 20% and
40% reductions in nitrate loss from pre-policy lev-
els for three New York farming regions. These
payments differ by environmental standard, region,
and group. Across all regions, payments ranged
from less than $1 to as high as $20 per acre, rep-
resenting up to 12$Z0 of pre-policy net return. The
information premium increased with the stringency
of environmental standards, reaching a high of $5
per acre. If one assumes complete participation,
aggregate payments would range from $0.6 million
to $2.4 million over the regions combined, depend-
ing on the stringency of environmental standards.
Even under these high participation rates, this pro-
gram is not terribly expensive, representing less
than 15% of the commodit y payments for the three
regions in 1992.
Because the group of pollution-prone soils is
relatively small, the information premium repre-
sents only about 10VOof payments. In New York,
the administrative capacity to eliminate this pre-
mium is already in place; the use value assessment
program requires agricultural offices to classify
farmland by tax parcel into several soil groups
(Thomas and Boisvert 1995). The cost to taxpayers
of allowing farmers to select policies is not large in
the case examined, but it may be much larger in
other areas like the Midwest where vulnerable soils
are more common,
While it is important to estimate the costs of full
participation for comparison purposes, 100% vol-
untary participation could hardly be expected in
these large regions, Based on the relatively small
enrollment in other agro-environmental programs
in New York (Poe 1998), the estimated payments
may be too small to overcome farmers’ transaction
costs of participating. Still, allowing farmers to
self-select may increase participation levels,
ceter-is paribus.
Clearly, such programs are most effective if tar-
geted to small areas where damages are severe. In
a somewhat stylized example targeting only the
most vulnerable soils, Peterson and Boisvert
(1998) estimate substantially higher per acre pay-
ments and information premiums, but substantially
lower total costs, The program’s effectiveness may
also be quite different if it imposed another kind of
management practice, But, even in these cases, we
must understand better the factors that influence
voluntary farmer participation. More research is
needed to identify soil characteristics that more
sharply isolate the vulnerable soils, to refine the
nitrogen yield response functions, and to under-
stand the administrative costs of voluntary pro-
grams.
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